1 Static Analysis of The DeepSeek Android App

faustinolanglo edited this page 2025-02-10 23:32:53 +01:00

I conducted a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to recognize prospective security and privacy problems.

I have actually blogged about DeepSeek previously here.

Additional security and privacy concerns about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See also this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on static analysis. This means that while the code exists within the app, there is no conclusive proof that all of it is executed in practice. Nonetheless, the existence of such code warrants analysis, particularly given the growing concerns around information personal privacy, security, the prospective misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics between global powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising concerns about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure identifies these in the iPhone app yesterday also.

• Bespoke file encryption and data obfuscation approaches exist, with signs that they might be used to exfiltrate user details.
• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, instead of counting on the user gadget's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking captures detailed user habits without clear consent. - WebView manipulation is present, which could permit the app to gain access to personal external web browser data when links are opened. More details about WebView adjustments is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A substantial portion of the examined code appears to concentrate on gathering device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app gathers different unique gadget identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System residential or commercial properties, set up plans, and root detection mechanisms recommend prospective anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that privacy advocates and security scientists use to root their Android gadgets. - Geolocation and network profiling are present, indicating possible tracking abilities and allowing or disabling of fingerprinting programs by area. - Hardcoded device design lists recommend the application might act in a different way depending on the found hardware. - Multiple vendor-specific services are used to extract additional gadget details. E.g. if it can not determine the gadget through basic Android SIM lookup (because permission was not approved), it attempts manufacturer particular extensions to access the very same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, numerous observed habits line up with known spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which could help with unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, serial numbers, and other device-specific information are aggregated for unknown functions.
• The app implements country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, suggesting possible surveillance systems.
• The app executes calls to fill Dex modules, where additional code is loaded from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so files themselves turn around and annunciogratis.net make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be utilized to load additional.so files. This center is not generally inspected by Google Play Protect and other fixed analysis services.
• The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. Using native code includes a layer of complexity to the analysis procedure and obscures the full level of the app's abilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily escalate opportunities, wiki.asexuality.org possibly making use of vulnerabilities within the operating system or device hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While information collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, raises considerable personal privacy issues. The DeepSeek app requires users to visit with a valid email, which must currently supply adequate authentication. There is no legitimate reason for the app to aggressively gather and transmit distinct gadget identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system residential or commercial properties.
  
  The level of tracking observed here exceeds normal analytics practices, possibly making it possible for relentless user tracking and re-identification throughout gadgets. These behaviors, integrated with obfuscation strategies and network communication with third-party tracking services, require a higher level of examination from security scientists and users alike.
  
  The work of runtime code packing as well as the bundling of native code recommends that the app could allow the deployment and execution of unreviewed, remotely provided code. This is a major genbecle.com possible attack vector. No evidence in this report exists that remotely deployed code execution is being done, just that the facility for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's technique to discovering rooted devices appears excessive for an AI chatbot. Root detection is often warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and content security are important, or in competitive video games to prevent unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for such stringent measures in an application of this nature, raising further questions about its intent.
  
  Users and companies thinking about setting up DeepSeek must know these prospective risks. If this application is being used within a business or forum.altaycoins.com federal government environment, additional vetting and security controls should be enforced before allowing its implementation on managed devices.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis presented in this report is based upon fixed code evaluation and does not imply that all spotted functions are actively utilized. Further investigation is needed for conclusive conclusions.